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Contracting in expeditionary operations is not new. What is new is the scope and magnitude of the roles that contracting and contractors play in today’s military operations. Lack of planning and sound contract integration at the strategic level leads to inefficiencies, ineffectiveness, and, in many cases, outright fraud. Annex W, Operational Contract Support Plan, is the overall operations plan for Geographic Combatant Commands and the Services within the Adaptive Planning and Execution System framework. The authors propose an Integrated Planner and Executor (IPE) model for operational contract support and its integration into Annex W and existing war planning systems by congressionally mandating, authorizing, and funding IPE positions within Service structures. The IPE would be vested with the authority to establish, monitor, and manage Annex W.
Military organizations throughout the world are increasingly called to perform missions and create outcomes that are reliant on contractor support. In fact, contractors perform myriad functions in modern, often complex, military operations. Additionally, the military services are subject to ever increasing scrutiny and accountability to become better stewards of scarce resources, to eliminate potential waste, and to reduce abuse of taxpayer money due to poor management, operational redundancy and duplication of effort, and outright corruption.
Military Stands to Gain from Newest Initiatives in Doctrine
Because of an increased reliance on contractors and recent demands for improved accountability and performance, the authors contend that international military organizations will benefit by incorporating Phase Zero Contracting Operations (PZCO), and strategic and integrative planning for contingency and expeditionary operations. The PZCO concept has gained high-level attention as it is now embedded in Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, Joint Operation Planning (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff [CJCS], 2011), and in JP 4-10, Operational Contract Support (OCS) (CJCS, 2008), and currently under revision. Additionally, PZCO protocols were proposed and published in 2010, and the concept has gained popularity among military leaders seeking to improve military capability while following sound business practices (Yoder, 2010). PZCO, in essence and conceptually, is somewhat already embedded in recent doctrine, specifically within JP 5-0 and JP 4-10. However, it is not being fully implemented. This article addresses shortfalls in implementation, conceptually and pragmatically. Additionally, the authors utilize two analytical frameworks—the Three-Tier Model (TTM) and three pillars for integrative success—to identify shortfalls and recommendations for improvements.
The PZCO concept for strategic leaders and planners is presented, including the scope and magnitude of current and future contractor support, the need for integration and coordination amongst stakeholders, key PZCO model constructs, and alignment with key aspects of the Adaptive Planning and Execution System (APEX), which must include contracting. Finally, conclusions and recommendations are provided for forward-thinking leaders and planners.
The Scope and Magnitude of Contractor Support in Expeditionary Operations
Contracting in expeditionary operations is not a new phenomenon. What is new is the scope and magnitude that contracting and contractors play in today’s military operations. For example, in March 2011 the Congressional Research Service reported that in the Central Command Area of Responsibility, the ratio of contractors to uniformed personnel supporting operations was .81:1 (Schwartz & Swain, 2011). Even if global operating tempos decline, many experts believe that reliance on contractor personnel will remain at current levels, or even grow, in relation to the number of uniformed personnel. The New York Times reported in February 2012 that 113,491 contractor personnel were in Afghanistan compared to 90,000 U.S. soldiers (Nordland, 2012). It should be noted that not all contractors in theater were directly supporting Department of Defense (DoD) operations in that, for example, the United States Agency for International Development and many private volunteer organizations and nongovernmental organizations utilize contractors and may be included in The New York Times-reported tally.
Particularly noteworthy is the scope and variety of contracted functions. These functions include base operations support, weapon systems support, security services, and a host of others.
Based on continued public and political pressure to keep organic uniform force structures low, the continued reliance on contract support for military
operations is not likely to wane.
High Reliance on Contracted Support Has Created Challenges
Based on continued public and political pressure to keep organic uniform force structures low, the continued reliance on contract support for military operations is not likely to wane. Nevertheless, this high reliance on contractor support has also created challenges for military planners, operators, contracting units, and even for the contractors themselves. Challenges have manifested in command and control, in integration into Geographic Combatant Command (GCC) battle and operational schema, and in the need for advanced planning, phasing, and timing of contracting events to synchronize with and complement operations plans (OPLAN). Additionally, planners must consider communications and movement plans, weapons control, compliance with Host Nation and Status of Forces Agreements (SOFA), contract management and oversight, indemnity and insurance of government-contracted personnel, prevention of human trafficking, third-country national labor protections, issuing and maintaining security clearances, and lawsuits under the Defense Base Act, to name only a few. Many of the challenges stem from a shift in organic uniformed-force capability to a contracted capability—from “doing” to “managing.” So what can military leaders and planners do to effectively and efficiently manage all of these aspects of contracted support? The incorporation of PZCO into the design and construct of military planning will address many of the challenges identified previously.
Credentialed Contract Planners Integrated with Operations Planners and Stakeholders
The TTM, a credential-based personnel hierarchy for contracting officers and planning staff, was published to address the challenges inherent in contracting in complex military operations (Yoder, 2004). It optimizes the integrative planning, coordination, and execution required for contingency and expeditionary operations at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of the organization. The model is based on two primary premises. First, mission optimization occurs only with well-credentialed contracting planners and executors. Second, optimized stakeholder integration, including, for example, operational commanders, supporting units, nongovernmental organizations (NGO), and private voluntary organizations (PVO), can only be accomplished by utilizing well-credentialed participants in the planning and execution phases (Yoder, 2011).
Phase Zero Contracting Operations—The Three-Tier Model
The TTM has specific personnel credentials in three primary tiers: (a) Tier One—Training and education; (b) Tier Two—Certification (such as Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act [DAWIA] contracting levels, security clearance requirements, etc.); and (c) Tier Three—Experience.
The three tiers are described in the following paragraphs.
In Tier One, the ordering officer serves at the lowest level. This contracting level has several identifying attributes. Tier One personnel reside within the tactical level of the military hierarchy and are the most prevalent contracting personnel within most formal military and civilian organizations. The Tier One personnel are junior civilians and military staff. They operate at the tactical and unit levels, and perform no integrative planning at the operational and strategic levels. Tier One personnel place basic orders and conduct simple transactions. In the broadest terms, little stakeholder integration is being initiated or managed at this level. However, this lowest level is absolutely essential because it represents where a majority of “in-the-field” contracting actions are conducted. Tier One is the tactical level of the enterprise. Particular importance at Tier One is placed on standardized training—emphasizing protocols, ethical conduct, management, control, and oversight.
In the middle of the hierarchy is Tier Two, which leverages the capabilities of contracting officers who serve at the operational level. The Tier Two personnel require enhanced credentials. These personnel conduct complex contracting transactions and leverage local economy assets. They may perform all functions associated with Tier One personnel, but with increased credentials, scope, and responsibilities. The TTM calls for Tier Two personnel to be mid-level civilians, mid-grade officers, or credentialed senior enlisted. They can be integrated into planning and local operations, performing some integrative planning at the tactical and operational levels; and they can perform some liaison functions with broader stakeholders. Their main mission is to optimize local operations in harmony with strategic guidance. They will also prepare Annex W, Operational Contract Support Plan, when serving on a Joint Task Force staff during crisis action planning. Since Tier Two personnel serve at the operational level of the organization, expertise in the protocols, ethical conduct, management, control and oversight, conduct of complex negotiations, broad business acumen in complex military contracting, and phase I Joint Professional Military Education (JPME I) is required. Currently, the Naval Postgraduate School and the Defense Acquisition University offer CON 234–Contingency Contracting and CON 334–Advanced Contingency Contracting courses to standardize education in the contingency contracting business field.
An IPE must be strategically positioned within the organization to achieve the highest levels of integrative planning.
The highest and most crucial tier in the TTM is Tier Three, the flag officer or senior civilian position designated as the integrated planner and executor (IPE). The Tier Three personnel are at the strategic level of military and civilian organizations. Tier Three calls for the highest credentials including, but not be limited to, JPME I & II, DAWIA Contracting Level III certification and warrant (or international equivalent), a graduate degree or higher, a Top Secret security clearance, and experience in operations and contracting gained through experiential tours or assignments (Yoder, 2010). Figure 1 highlights the key aspects of the IPE position (Yoder, 2011).
Figure 1. Three-Tier Model: Tier Three, Integrated Planner and Executor
An IPE must be strategically positioned within the organization to achieve the highest levels of integrative planning. The IPE’s primary mission is creating and validating a comprehensive Annex W to complement all elements of the OPLAN. Ideally, the IPE position should be placed within the Joint Staff, at GCC, and at the highest operational and planning staffs within each Service branch.
The IPE will create and validate Annex W in all key GCC OPLAN and concept plan (CONPLAN) elements. (Specific content elements of Annex W are presented later in this article.) Because of the complexity and magnitude of the tasks involved in creating and validating comprehensive plans, the IPE requires a supporting staff and subordinate expertise in key strategic and analytical areas, such as OPLAN analysis, logistics assessments, contracting, and similar professional disciplines.
Of note, most organizations do not have a dedicated contracting IPE (by any moniker) within their organizational structure. Traditionally, the joint logistics (J-4) organizations have embedded contracting officers. However, the contracting positions within J-4, or within traditional logistics organizations, have been utilized as adjunct positions to the broader logistics functional planning. Additionally, because of the relatively low military rank and lack of seniority, contracting personnel on J-4 staffs often lack both the credentials and the clout to effectively execute the requirements proposed for the IPE.
Despite the DoD Components and military services lacking an IPE at the strategic level, the National Defense Authorization Act of 2008 (NDAA, 2008) made significant impact at addressing credentialed personnel shortfalls at the strategic level. The NDAA 2008 authorized and established the Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office (JCASO), directed by a military one-star flag officer, positioned within the Defense Logistics Agency. JCASO has a staff of 49 personnel expressly to provide IPE strategic-level assistance and contract support to GCCs. These JCASO specialists work with GCC planning staffs to incorporate essential contracting plans at the GCC. According to Navy Rear Admiral Ron J. MacLaren, director of JCASO, each GCC is allocated two specialists from JCASO to assist in the development and exercise of each key OPLAN’s Annex W (MacLaren, 2012).
Will the DoD Components and the military services embrace the TTM, particularly the IPE function established by NDAA 2008 as the JCASO? Currently, JCASO has not been empowered with authority to compel GCC or the DoD Components and military services to utilize their OCS development functions. Rather, it represents an advisory group that must “sell” its capabilities to improve mission support through integrative planning (MacLaren, 2012). Only time and sound metric analysis will prove whether or not the JCASO is effective at creating the needed Annex W OCS plans mandated and needed for key GCC OPLANs.
What specifically will the IPE position accomplish, and what will it achieve? If the warfighters are to embrace OCS, they must understand what essential functions the IPE achieves, and how those functions will yield benefits.
Phase Zero—Planning, Exercising, and Rehearsal
Phase Zero, generally known in GCC planning arenas as the shaping phase, is adopted by the OCS contracting community as the planning and exercising phase. Traditional military jargon defines Phase Zero as “shaping.” Phase Zero contracting in the integrative strategic planning arena is the advance planning, exercising, and rehearsal of robust contracting support plans designed to complement the GCC’s deliberate and contingency planning process. Realistically, the contracting community and the warfighter have the same vision for Phase Zero—get the plans in place, then rehearse, validate, and update them to reflect current realities. In essence, Phase Zero contract planning and the creation of OPLAN Annex W became mandatory under NDAA 2008 (Government Accountability Office [GAO], 2011). The authorization and supporting guidance under JP 4-10 (CJCS, 2008), requires all GCCs to create Annex W for OPLANs, representing the embodiment of Phase Zero integrative planning. However, despite the mandate, what is particularly disconcerting is that the GAO recently determined that only four out of 39 OPLANs requiring comprehensive Annex W integration plans actually had them (GAO, 2011). The low rate of Annex W integration may be a result of the challenges in assimilation and normalization of new doctrine and processes that DoD initially approved in 2008. MacLaren indicates that significant work is ahead to get all the GCC OPLAN Annex W support plans in place and exercised (MacLaren, 2012). The authors contend that current operational tempos, along with constrained budgets, may preclude achieving fully integrated exercises and rehearsals for all OPLANs, as these rehearsals can carry a huge price tag. However, failure to exercise and rehearse, based on recent and well-documented problems in Iraq and Afghanistan, results in costs that far outweigh the up-front costs to fully vet Annex W plans. Deliberate planning and contingency planning are different—the first is not necessarily time-sensitive, but the second may be very time-sensitive and is often constrained. While JCASO has assigned two specialists at each GCC to assist in creating and exercising each Annex W, ultimately, the DoD Component and military services’ contract warrant holders will be responsible for providing actual contract support, and must be included in the planning, exercise, rehearsal, and execution of the OPLAN. For the most critical OPLANs, sound strategy requires the exercise and rehearsal of each Annex W with the personnel that will ultimately be called into action.
Ideally, each OPLAN and CONPLAN will have an Annex W, fully drafted, exercised, rehearsed, analyzed, and revised. The doctrinal framework published in JP 5-0, along with JP 4-10, is key for the design and integration of contracting into OPLANs. The authors note that JP 5-0 does not currently require an Annex W—only JP 4-10 requires it. The objective is to embed and synchronize the OCS plan with all elements of the OPLAN to meet the commander’s intent. Properly constructed Annex W plans must include elements such as, but not limited to, personnel/organizational structures and authorities; business protocols, including special statutory and regulatory provisions under declared contingencies; scheme of operations; synchronization with the battle plan; oversight; management and auditing; personnel regulations and provisions; spend analysis integration; synchronization with broader strategic objectives; and metrics for assessment of the efficiencies and effectiveness of embedded plans and actions (Yoder, 2011).
To ensure the efficacy of the integrated Annex W plan, the IPE must act as a strategic liaison with key stakeholders. Analytical assessments of the Annex W plan may utilize strength, weakness, opportunity, threat (SWOT) and capability gap analysis techniques. The SWOT method allows the IPE to evaluate the strengths, weaknesses/limitations, opportunities, and threats; and, ultimately, the potential efficacy of the OPLAN’s integrated contracting plan. The capability gap analysis determines the support and provisioning gaps in the OPLAN that may be addressed through contracted support.
Contracting Phases—Complementing Warfighter Strategy
Contingency contracting planning must complement and seamlessly integrate with the DoD and Combatant Command APEX planning process. On the surface, the two processes appear distinctly different, with phasing graphics exhibiting dissimilar phasing models and activity descriptions within each phase. Examination of each model reveals that the two processes are complementary, but care must be taken to ensure that contracting phasing supports and is parallel with operational planning.
The DoD deliberate planning process generally includes six phases, although the number and types of phases are contingent upon the characteristics of the joint operation. For instance, a combat operation will be phased differently than a humanitarian relief operation. JP 5-0 describes the notional phasing construct (Figure 2) as follows: Phase 0 (Shape) includes normal and routine military activities as well as security cooperation activities that are contained within the theater campaign plan (TCP). The TCP includes steady state operations and activities intended to promote international legitimacy and cooperation with friends and allies, while dissuading adversaries. Phase I (Deter) includes those activities that demonstrate “joint force capabilities and resolve” in response to an adversary’s undesirable actions. Actions include preparation for deployment, deployment, and shows of force designed to influence an adversary’s decision-making process. Phase II (Seize Initiative) begins the “application of appropriate joint force capabilities” to “delay, impede, or halt an adversary’s initial aggression.”
This phase sets the conditions for the successful implementation of the Phase III (Dominate) phase. Phase III includes actions designed to “break the enemy’s will . . . or, in noncombat operations, to control the operational environment.” Phase IV (Stabilize) is “required when there is no fully functional legitimate civil governing authority,” and joint forces must perform limited local governance and other activities to allow for a restoration of stability and a return to normalcy. This phase may require joint force cooperation and coordination with intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, or other civilian agencies. Phase V (Enable Civil Authority) includes the provision of “joint force support to legitimate civil governance” in theater as well as assistance with the provision of essential services to local populations. It usually includes redeployment operations, especially of combat forces, as well as the planning for transition back to Phase 0 or steady-state operations. Figure 3 illustrates the notional operation plan phases (CJCS, 2011, pp. III-41–III-44).
Figure 2. Warfighter’s Notional Operational Plan Phases
Figure 3. Three-Tier Model: Tier Three, Integrated Planner and Executor
Since NDAA 2008, contracting has utilized five support phases. Phase Zero (Figure 4) is the planning, exercise, and rehearsal phase. During this phase, contingency contracting planners work with combatant command staffs in the deliberate planning process to develop the Annex W for each campaign and operations plan. Exercising and rehearsing these plans is imperative to ensure they meet the warfighter’s expectations and correspond with Phase 0 of the deliberate planning process. Phase I is deployment, during which initial contracting operations and relationships are established, especially to provide basic life support requirements for arriving personnel. It corresponds roughly with the first half of the warfighter’s Phase I (Deter).
The contracting Phase II is joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration. This phase includes the arrival of the main body of deploying forces and their equipment. It requires the establishment of more robust contracting initiatives, including expanded life support requirements and temporary construction to support the deployed force and corresponds with the warfighter’s Phase I (Deter), as well as elements of Phase II (Seize Initiative). Phase III (Sustainment) provides contracting support from the completion of the build-up phase until the beginning of the redeployment of the force. It also includes stability and reconstruction. This contingency contracting phase corresponds with the warfighter’s Phase II (Seize Initiative), Phase III (Dominate), Phase IV (Stabilize), and portions of Phase V (Enable Civil Authority). The contracting Phase IV is termination and redeployment, and includes activities that support the “pressure and urgency to send the deployed forces home.” It also includes close-out of existing contracts as well as establishing contracts for follow-on forces, such as United Nations peacekeepers (Defense Procurement, 2012, pp. 111–121).
DoD Directive (DoDD) 3020.49 mandates the coordination and synchronization of contracting with broader warfighter OPLANs (DoD, 2009). As Figure 4 illustrates, contracting phasing does not correspond exactly with the warfighter’s phasing plan. This lack of correspondence can lead to misunderstanding, lack of communication within the planning staff, and a failure of coordination and synchronization. The authors strongly suggest that contracting personnel revise the phasing plan to more closely correspond with the JP 5.0 phasing construct.
Figure 4. Contracting Phase Zero: Plan, Exercise, Rehearse, and Synchronize
Phase Zero and Mandatory Pillars for Strategic Contracting Integration
As defined previously, Phase Zero is the planning, exercising, and rehearsal phase of military operations—properly establishing and vetting the contracting plan prior to an actual event or crisis. To function effectively within the established and existing military deliberate and contingency planning framework, the IPE and associated functions must be designed within three main pillars: personnel, platforms, and protocols (Figure 5). Failure to integrate contracting with all of the three primary pillars will result in suboptimization or outright contract support and/or mission failure (Yoder, 2010).
Figure 5. Mandatory Pillars for Integrative Success
The first pillar, personnel, should be addressed by implementing the TTM and particularly the IPE. The second pillar, platforms, is addressed by integrating contracting throughout all phases of military operations and into the existing warfighters’ platform for planning and execution—the APEX. Additionally, it must be embedded with other APEX-complementary platforms, such as the Time Phased Force and Deployment Data (TPFDD) system. The third pillar, protocols, represents the existing or desirable set of rules and procedures, including sound business, planning, and military doctrine that govern the planning and execution of the contracting plan within the broader OPLAN. Figure 5 highlights the three pillars and associated elements.
Protocols include, but are not limited to, the strategic planning guidance established by the GCC; strategic purchasing guidance and mandates; JP 4-10, JP 5-0, JP 4-0, Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations (CJCS, 2000), and other doctrinal publications; and associated mandates for constructing and implementing Annex W for each unique OPLAN. Additionally, acquisition- and contracting-specific laws, regulations, and guidance must be utilized including, but not limited to, the Federal Acquisition Regulation (2012) and the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (Defense Procurement, 2013), as well as any specific military service acquisition regulations.
Annex W must include all of the key elements for mission success and address the three mandatory pillars for integrative success: personnel, platforms, and protocols.
The Integrated Planner and Executor within Strategic Planning, APEX Products, and Annex W
Joint strategic planning products include, but are not limited to, GCC estimates, base plans, OPLANs, CONPLANs, warning orders, planning orders, alert orders, operation orders (OPORD), execute orders, fragmentary orders, and deployment orders, along with all annexes including the newly mandated Annex W. These products are alien to most contracting and acquisition professionals because, traditionally, contracting and acquisition personnel have not played a key role in the production or management of these critical documents. The GAO recently conducted an audit of 39 OPLANs requiring an integrated Annex W, and found that only four operational contracting plans had been produced (GAO, 2011).
Clearly, given the defined content of Annex W, the contracting at the strategic IPE level must be included in all phases of planning and in the production of key APEX products. Annex W must include all of the key elements for mission success and address the three mandatory pillars for integrative success: personnel, platforms, and protocols. The integrated Annex W must include, at a minimum, those elements deemed essential for mission accomplishment, while addressing cost and affordability within the overall OPLAN. The contents include, but are not limited to, as indicated in Yoder (2010), the 26 elements shown in Figure 6.
Without a comprehensive planning capability, most missions will be negatively affected. Clearly, the IPE, properly positioned within the planning community, can better create and assess the Annex W capabilities within the three main pillars—personnel, platforms, and protocols—to allow for future success.
Figure 6. Minimum Elements Included in an Integrated Annex W
|1.||Mission statement—from the OPLAN or OPORD|
|2.||Primary and secondary customers|
|3.||Anticipated requirements (in relative time-phase)|
|4.||Forces deploying in sequence and duration|
|7.||Organization structure (Head of Contracting Activity, Joint Acquisition Review Board, etc.)|
|8.||Supported and supporting relationships|
|9.||Command and control relationships|
|10.||Procedures for appointing, training, and employing field ordering officers, contacting officer representatives, disbursing agents, and government purchase card holders|
|11.||Procedures for defining, validating, processing, and satisfying customer requirements|
|12.||Procedures for budgeting receipt of supplies/services and payments to vendors|
|13.||Procedures for closing out contracting operations and redeployment|
|14.||Supplies and services anticipated locally, local customs, laws, taxes, SOFAs, host nation support, Acquisition Cross-Service Agreements, vendor base, etc.|
|15.||Infrastructure, office location, security measures, kits, etc.|
|16.||Security requirements and procedures for contracting and contractor personnel|
|17.||Standards of support—processing times, turn-around-time, Procurement Acquisition Lead Time, and reporting|
|18.||Specific statutory/regulatory constraints or exemptions, special authorities, and programs|
|19.||Relief in place/transfer of authority|
|20.||Contractor restrictions (movement, basing, etc., time-phase specific)|
|21.||Guidance on transferring Logistics Civil Augmentation Program support to theater support contracts by function and/or phase of the operation|
|22.||Special authorities and programs (Commanders’ Emergency Response Program–Counterinsurgency)|
|23.||Postcontract award actions (management, closeout, de-obligation, etc.)|
|24.||Contractor support, civil augmentation programs|
|25.||Mandated solicitation and contract provisions|
|26.||Human trafficking mandates, indemnity, and Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act provisions|
To date, contracting has not been fully integrated into military planning and execution. Some significant strides have been made to better assimilate contracting at the strategic level, including Dr. Jacques Gansler’s (2007) report, Urgent Reform Required, and the recently published doctrine contained in JP 4-10 (CJCS, 2008). However, despite the push toward better integration, including the newly formed JCASO, the DoD still lacks a manifest comprehensive planning and executing capability, as evidenced most recently in the final report of the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan (2011).
The lack of planning and sound contract integration at the strategic level leads to loss of efficiencies, lack of effectiveness, and, in many cases, outright fraud of the executing participants as highlighted in the 2011 report of the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan.
The functions of the IPE and mandates for OCS (CJCS, 2008), including generating a thoroughly vetted Annex W, are so massive that the Services have recently contracted out, or outsourced, some of the requirement (Yoder, 2011). However, outsourcing this critical function may only make matters worse, in that key decisions will be left in the purview of nongovernment personnel, including decisions of further contracting, along with other possible conflicts of interest and potential for corruption.
The authors contend that the best means to accomplish integration into existing war planning systems is by congressionally mandating, authorizing, and funding (via appropriation) the IPE positions at the flag and senior executive service levels within Service structures. In the short term, the authors recommend that JCASO have more status and capability within GCC and Service staffs, particularly in assisting the GCC staff to establish, monitor, and manage Annex W within the APEX framework. This will require greater engagement capability than currently exists. In the long-term, the authors recommend Congressional approval and funding of IPE positions organically within the GCC staff, providing them with direct authority for the development, review, and employment of Annex W. This greater presence and authority at the IPE level within the GCC staff represents the level of bona fide commitment to solve a long-standing problem that, without correction, will continue to fester and plague Service chiefs, military commanders, Congress, and taxpayers. Additionally, fully aligning and integrating the contracting community’s processes with the joint community planning system is imperative. Failure to do so may result in lack of communication, lack of synchronization of support plans, and marginalization of contracting personnel within the GCC planning staff. Implementing PZCO planning through sound public policy, congressional authorization and funding, and the Services’ commitment to fully integrate contracting within the three pillars—personnel, platforms, and protocols—is the proactive move toward success.
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CDR E. Cory Yoder, USN (Ret.), is a senior lecturer and academic associate at the Naval Postgraduate School. Yoder holds an MA in National Security and Strategic Studies (Naval War College); an MS in Management (Naval Postgraduate School); a BS in Business Management (Indiana University); and Business Resource Management certificate (University of Virginia – Darden). Yoder is a Beta Gamma Sigma honor society member and RADM John J. Schieffelin awardee.
(E-mail address: email@example.com)
Maj William E. Long, Jr., USAF (Ret.), is a professor of Contract Management at the Defense Acquisition University with broad experience in contingency and expeditionary contracting. He led the team that authored DoD’s first-ever Defense Contingency Contracting Handbook and was crucial in standardizing critical contracting principles, techniques, and procedures. Professor Long holds an MBA from Embry Riddle University and a BS in Business Management from Troy University.
(E-mail address: firstname.lastname@example.org)
Dr. Dayne E. Nix is an associate professor of joint maritime operations at the Naval War College. A retired Navy Chaplain and former U.S. Marine Corps Officer, he holds an M.A. from the Naval War College and a Ph.D. from Salve Regina University. His has published works on Muhammad Iqbal of Pakistan (Mellen Press) and the Civil Military Relations of Samuel P. Huntington (Naval War College Review, Spring 2012).
(E-mail address: email@example.com)
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