Typical acquisition reform efforts have been focused in the margins, achieving marginal results. The evidence of decades of acquisition reform indicates that the marginal reforms typically taken are not making the fundamental changes needed by the Department of Defense (DoD). Legislative changes made since 2009 and several years of Better Buying Power refinements have incrementally improved acquisition practice, but many would argue that more change is needed.
Congratulations! Since you wrote code in the past, you’re now designated as a software program manager for automated information systems (AISs) and information technology (IT). Don’t forget, you developed embedded digital engine control code or perhaps published vehicle dynamics modeling software, and so human resources now deems you as “in-the-know” about all matters IT, AIS and/or Defense Business Systems (DBS) technology. You have now been assigned to start managing one of the Department of Defense (DoD) IT/AIS programs somewhere in the system’s engineering process—perhaps in requirements or functional analysis and allocation or in synthesis.
Today many people have different attitudes when they try to formulate manufacturing technology transfer policies. On one hand, some proponents of technology transfer see it as a way to improve the U.S. international competitive position. On the other hand, concerns with undesirable and sometimes unanticipated side effects of the transfer of sensitive and critical technology have led to sentiments against technology transfer.